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Residual income and value creation:
An investigation into the lost-capital paradigm
Abstract
This paper presents a new way of measuring residual income, originally introduced by Magni
(2000a,b,c, 2001a,b, 2003). Contrary to the standard residual income, the capital charge is equal to
the capital lost by investors multiplied by the cost of capital. The lost capital may be viewed as (a)
the foregone capital, (b) the capital implicitly infused into the business, (c) the outstanding capital
of a shadow project, (d) the claimholders’ credit. Relations of the lost capital with book values and
market values are studied, as well as relations of the lost-capital residual income with the classical
standard paradigm; many appealing properties are derived, among which an aggregation property.
Different concepts and results, provided by different authors in such different fields as economic the-
ory, accounting and corporate finance, are considered: O’Hanlon and Peasnell’s (2002) unrecovered
capital and Excess Value Created; Ohlson’s (2005) Abnormal Earnings Growth; O’Byrne’s (1997)
EVA improvement; Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) investment opportunities approach to valuation;
Young and O’Byrne’s (2001) Adjusted EVA; Keynes’s (1936) user cost; Drukarczyk and Schueler’s
(2000) Net Economic Income; Ferna´ndez’s (2002) Created Shareholder Value; Anthony’s (1975)
profit. They are all conveniently reinterpreted within the theoretical domain of the lost-capital
paradigm and conjoined in a unified view. The results found make this new theoretical approach
a good candidate for firm valuation, capital budgeting decision-making, managerial incentives and
control.
Keywords. Accounting, corporate finance, residual income, value creation, management, incentive compensa-
tion, lost capital, Net Present Value, book value, market value.
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Introduction
Residual income is income in excess of an income that could be obtained if investors invested their funds at the
opportunity cost of capital. Introduced in the first half of the past century (e.g. Preinreich, 1936, 1938) the term
“residual income” has been first used by Solomons (1965). The terms “abnormal earnings” and “excess profit”
are also used in management accounting and business economics to mean earnings (profit) in excess of normal
earnings (profit). While it was a minor area of research in the 1950s and 1960s, the massive literature developed
on project and firm valuation in the last forty years have induced a renewed interest on residual income, both as
a valuation tool and as a basis for management compensation. Important works such as Peasnell’s (1981, 1982)
and Ohlson’s (1989, 1995) in accounting finance, Rogerson’s (1997) and Reichelstein’s (1997) in management
accounting and the proposal of Economic Value Added in applied corporate finance (Stewart, 1991) have triggered
a considerable amount of contributions in various fields. In particular, the notion of residual income is used in
several kinds of optimization problems. For example, a lively debate concerns the so-called principal-agent
problem, where a firm’s owner (principal) delegates investment to a better informed manager (agent), who is to
be induced to optimal investment through an appropriate rewarding contract. In this research area, Rogerson
(1997) consider the situation where the manager exerts an unobservable level of effort each period that increases
the firm’s cash flow; the principal is willing to maximize the NPV of the firm whereas the manager is willing
to maximize his own utility. The principal knows the relative productivity of the asset, but not the absolute
productivity which is known only to the manager. The author considers the use of an allocation rule (depreciation
schedule+opportunity cost) and a contract according to which the manager’s wage is weakly increasing with
respect to residual income. In this context, the author shows that there is a unique allocation rule that maximizes
both the firm’s NPV and the manager’s utility: such a rule is the so-called Relative Marginal Benefit rule and is
given by the ratio of periodic relative productivity to the discounted sum of all periodic relative productivities:
%t/
(∑T
k=1
%k
(1+i)k
)
where %t is the relative productivity and i is the opportunity cost of capital (Rogerson, 1997,
eq. 25). In case productivity is constant, this allocation rule boils down to 1/
(∑T
k=1
1
(1+i)k
)
which corresponds to
the instalment of a T -year annuity whose present value is equal to one. In this operations management context,
a significant contribution is Baldenius and Reichelstein (2005), who examine efficient inventory management
from an incentive and control perspective: the firm delegates decisions on production to a manager who has
superior information and affects sales revenues with his productive efforts. They propose to value inventory with
a compounded historical cost valuation rule that capitalizes production costs and periodic holding costs and, in
addition, treats inventory as an interest-accruing asset (the value of each unit remaining in ending inventory in a
given period increases at the cost of capital i). The authors assume: (i) the manager’s objective is to maximize
the (expected) NPV of bonus payments, which are proportional to residual income, (ii) the optimal sales exceed
the available production capacity in each period of the inventory cycle, (iii) the LIFO (last-in-first-out) inventory
flow valuation rule is employed. This implies that value of inventory is
[
c(1 + i)t−t
∗
+
∑t−t∗
k=0 (1 + i)
k
]
xt, with
c=unit production cost, xt=ending inventory, t∗= beginning of inventory buildup. The authors show that the
optimal production and sales plan that maximizes the firm’s NPV is also the one that maximizes the NPV of
manager’s bonus payments; in the case where the manager receives updated information about future revenues
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after the initial production decision, the residual income based on the lower-of-cost-or-market rule becomes
the optimal incentive mechanism (see also Dutta and Zhang, 2002, on production incentives, and Pfeiffer and
Schneider, 2007). Dutta and Reichelstein (2005) analyze several different transactions: multi-year construction
contracts, long-term leases, asset disposals, research and development. Stoughton and Zechner (2007) consider
optimal capital allocation based on residual income in financial institutions assuming frictions in the market
and the presence of an institution constituted by a risky division and a riskless division. Baldenius, Dutta, and
Reichelstein (2006) deal with the case of optimal project selection in presence of several divisional managers.
Mohnen and Bareket (2007) provide a special residual income that is capable of inducing the agent to optimally
select a portfolio of projects, whereby the NPV is maximized. Grinyer and Walker (1990) and Stark (2000)
focus on real-option frameworks and find that a residual income-type performance measure can be designed
which supports optimal investment and disinvestment decisions (see also Friedl, 2005). Pfeiffer (2000) copes with
performance measures based on residual income and adjustment of hurdle rates (in another context, Antle and
Eppen, 1995, discuss the design of hurdle rates in a contracting setting including agency costs and asymmetric
information). Anctil (1996) and Anctil et al. (1998) find appropriate assumptions such that even if the manager
myopically maximizes residual income ignoring both future residual incomes and future cash flows, the resulting
policy will lead, asymptotically, to NPV maximization. The importance of this area of research for management
science is testified by Balachandran’s findings (2006). In portfolio optimizazion, Claus and Thomas (2001) use
the expected returns implied by the residual-income approach for forecasting the equity premium. The authors
argue that the use of residual income is superior compared to the dividend growth model and estimate the equity
premium for six countries, whose robustness is corroborated by sensitivity analyses. Hagemeister and Kempf
(2006) use expected returns implied by the residual-income model for Markowitz-optimization: they optimally
combine the residual-income-based estimator with the time series estimator using the Bayesian approach and find
that such a combination generates a better performance when compared to traditional estimation and investment
strategies. Hagemeister and Kempf (2007) use the same approach to test different versions of the Capital Asset
Pricing Model. Desroisiers, Lemaire, and L’Her (2007) use residual income to deduce the implicit expected rates
of return of nineteen countries: They consider zero-investment portfolios and implement a ranking strategy and
a mean-variance optimization strategy, finding that the strategies posted positive performances.
A major element in residual income is played by the opportunity cost (capital charge), which represents the
income that could be obtained by investing funds at the cost of capital. While the counterfactual feature of
the opportunity cost as a foregone income is well known (Coase, 1968; Buchanan, 1969), no debate has ever
taken place in the literature about possible alternative ways of computing such a counterfactual income. The
traditional accepted formalization of opportunity cost rests on the assumption of investment of the actual capital
at the cost of capital. In recent years, a new definition of residual income, called Systemic Value Added, has been
proposed in Magni (2000a,b,c, 2001a,b, 2003), derived from the comparison between two alternative dynamic
systems: The first one describes the net worth’s evolution in case of project acceptance, the second one refers
to project rejection. Rather than a particular metric, the Systemic Value Added is a paradigm, on the basis of
which one can construct infinite possible metrics. The paradigm has been thoroughly studied by the author from
several points of view: Conceptual, formal, theoretical, cognitive, empirical, historical (see Magni, 2004, 2005,
2006, 2009a,b; Ghiselli Ricci and Magni, 2006).
This paper revisits the Systemic-Value-Added paradigm, which is here renamed lost-capital paradigm. The
purpose is to show that this new paradigm may be useful for both valuation and management compensation,
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and that it is capable of encompassing seemingly disparate perspectives conjoining them in one single theoretical
domain. To this end, the lost-capital paradigm is thoroughly investigated in two senses: (i) Formal results are
provided aimed at clarifying both the link between performance and value creation and the link between residual
income and compensation plan; in addition, the formal and conceptual relations that the two paradigms bear one
another are studied; (ii) several notions, models and results in the literature are considered, spanning from the
1930s up to most recent years, ranging from microeconomics to management accounting and corporate finance.
Different as they are in aims and scope, they are here unified in the comprehensive theoretical domain of the lost-
capital paradigm. In particular, after a brief introduction of the standard paradigm (section 1) the lost-capital
paradigm is presented in section 2; in section 3 the two paradigms are connected via a cumulation procedure and
an aggregation property is shown for the lost-capital paradigm. Section 4 focuses on Ohlson’s (2005) Abnormal
Earnings Growth and O’Byrne’s (1997) Economic-Value-Added improvement; section 5 shows that a project’s
NPV is equal to the difference between its market value and the lost capital, and relates NPV, Market Value
Added and lost-capital residual income. In section 6 lost capital is shown to coincide with the notion of O’Hanlon
and Peasnell’s (2002) unrecovered capital and the NPV (=Excess Value Created) is split in past and prospective
lost-capital residual incomes; in section 7 it is shown that the lost-capital residual incomes is enfolded in Keynes’s
notion of user cost; the latter originates a goal congruent subclass of lost-capital residual incomes, here named
Keynesian Excess Profit. Within this subclass, Drukarczyk and Schueler’s (2000) Net Economic Income and the
lost-capital companion of Ferna´ndez’s (2002) Created Shareholder Value are briefly investigated (section 8). A
final unification of the two paradigms is shown to be implied by Anthony’s (1975) notion of profit: The use of
his argument leads to a subclass of residual income models that belong to both paradigms (section 9). Some
concluding remarks end the paper and a brief numerical example is illustrated in the Appendix.
Some caveats are worth underlining: (a) the analysis is meant to be valid for projects, firms, divisions, busi-
nesses. We will interchangeably use the terms ‘project’, ‘firm’, ‘business’; (b) the terms ‘outstanding balance’
and ‘outstanding capital’ are used as synonyms and refer to the actual capital employed (which will be distin-
guished from the capital infused into the business); (c) we will be concerned with a project (firm) described by
the cash-flow stream ~d = (−d0, d1, . . . dn). With no loss of generality, we will assume that the final cash flow
dn is inclusive of the project’s terminal value (a finite-time horizon is assumed); (d) for the sake of notational
convenience, cost of capital is constant (generalization to variable costs of capital is just a matter of symbology);
(e) main notational conventions are collected in Table 0 at the end of the paper.
1 The standard paradigm
Consider a project (firm) ~d=(−d0, d1, d2, . . . , dn) and a sequence of n uniperiodic subprojects ~dt such that ~dt =
−yt−1 · ~It + (yt + dt) · ~It+1, where ~It:=(0, 0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, 0, . . . , 0)∈ Rn+1 is the vector with all zeros except the t-th
entry which is equal to 1, t = 1, 2, . . . , n. Consider the vector ~y=(y0, y1, y2, . . . , yn) such that y0 := d0 and yt is
arbitrary in R for t = 1, 2, . . . n− 1. Let rt be such that
yt−1 =
yt + dt
1 + rt
(1)
for t≥ 1. We may interpret yt−1 as the capital employed in ~dt and rt as the period rate of return. From eq. (1),
one finds the recurrence equation linking successive capitals:
yt(~r) = yt−1(~r)(1 + rt)− dt (2)
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(Soper, 1959; Teichroew et al. 1965a, 1965b. See also Peasnell, 1982, p. 366), where the functional dependence
of the capital on the return rates is highlighted, being yt(~r):=yt(r1, r2, . . . , rt) for t ≥ 1. While yt(~r) may be any
number, from a financial point of view it is possible to interpret it as the actual capital employed in ~d at the
beginning of the (t+ 1)-th period and define income as the product of capital invested yt−1(~r) and rate of return
rt. The final yn(~r) is determined by picking t = n in eq. (2). If yn(~r)=0, then ~d =
∑n
t=1
~dt. The initial condition
y0(~r) := d0 says that the initial outstanding capital employed to undertake the project coincides with the capital
infused by the investors (it is a negative dividend). The Net Present Value (NPV) of subproject ~dt is
− yt−1(~r)
(1 + i)t−1
+
yt(~r) + dt
(1 + i)t
,
which becomes, owing to eq. (2),
yt−1(~r)(rt − i)
(1 + i)t
t = 1, . . . , n. (3)
It is widely known that the sum of these uniperiodic NPVs is just the project’s NPV:
NPV =
n∑
t=1
yt−1(~r)(rt − i)
(1 + i)t
(see Peasnell, 1981, 1982; Peccati, 1987, 1989; Martin and Petty, 2000; Lundholm and O’Keefe, 2001; Martin et
al. 2003; Ve´lez-Pareja and Tham, 2003; Ohlson, 2005).
Remark 1. It is worth noting that solving eq. (2) one finds
d0(1 + r)0,n −
n∑
t=1
dt(1 + r)t,n = yn(~r) (4)
where (1 + r)τ,h:=(1 + rτ+1) . . . (1 + rh). The vector ~r = (r1, r2, . . . rn) is a discount function that generalizes
the notion of internal rate of return. It is therefore an internal discount function (IDF) (see also Peasnell,
1981, p. 367). We stress that eq. (4) holds for any choice of ~r satisfying eq. (1) and for any choice of the
outstanding balances yt(~r) as well (rt and yt(~r) are in a biunivocal correspondence). This means that any such
discount function ~r is an IDF for the cash-flow stream (−d0, d1, . . . , dn + yn(~r)) (see also Ohlson, 2005). Let
~r∗ = (r∗1 , r
∗
2 , . . . , r
∗
n) be such that yn(~r
∗) = 0. Then, ~r ∗ is an IDF for the cash-flow stream (−d0, d1, . . . , dn).
Remark 2. If yt(~r) is the equity book value Bet , then rt is the Return On Equity (ROE), which determines an
IDF for firm ~d. Therefore, the ROE is an index with a genuine economic meaning (for relations between ROEs
and internal rate of return, see also Peasnell, 1982; Brief and Lawson, 1990). The amount rtBet−1 is obviously
the shareholders’ net profit.
Remark 3. The recurrence equation (2) is a familiar relation in finance, used in the construction of amortization
plans, and is consistent with the clean surplus relation often advocated in management accounting (Peasnell,
1982; Ohlson, 1989, 1995):
cash flow = income + capital’s depreciation.
This sets a link between accounting and loan theory: The time-t outstanding balance is, in an amortization
plan, the residual principal debt at time t; the IDF represents the contractual rate(s), the variation of the
outstanding balance is the principal repayment, the cash flows are the instalments, and the product rtyt−1(~r) is
the interest charge (see also Kellison, 1991; Promislow, 2006). The idea of income as interest is unambiguous
and already recognized in the relevant literature (see Forker and Powell, 2000, p. 237). This analogy is perfectly
fulfilled in Anthony’s perspective, where equity is seen as a shareholders’ credit (see section 9. See also Table 1).
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Let ~r∗ = (r∗1 , r
∗
2 , . . . , r
∗
n) be an IDF for project ~d, so that yn(~r
∗) = 0. We give the following definition:
Definition 1. The classical paradigm of residual income is formally represented by the set {xat } such that
xat = yt−1(~r
∗)(r∗t − i). (5)
In the standard definition of residual income a capital charge iyt−1(~r∗), representing counterfactual income, is
deducted from the actual income r∗t yt−1(~r
∗). The set {xat } of the standard paradigm consists of many infinite
residual income (RI) models, depending on the choice of ~r ∗ and the choice of the cost of capital i. The former
automatically determines the choice of ~y(~r∗), the latter depends on the perspective taken: Cost of equity if equity
cash flows are considered, weighted average cost of capital if free cash flows are used, pre-tax weighted average
cost of capital if capital cash flows are employed (see Ruback, 2002, and Ferna´ndez, 2002, for the notion of capital
cash flow). Among others, the following ones belong to the set of the standard RI models:
Entity approach. Stewart’s Economic Value Added (EVA) (Stewart, 1991) is found by selecting i=wacc,
r∗=ROA, and dt=free cash flow (consequently, y(~r∗) is the book value of total liabilities). Madden’s (1999) Cash
Flow Return On Investment (cfroi) is an (inflation-adjusted) internal rate of return of the business, obtained by
equating to zero the sum of the discounted free cash flows. The cfroi-based residual income is found by picking
dt=free cash flows, i=wacc, and r∗t=IRR (the outstanding balance y(~r
∗) is automatically determined by eq. (2)).
Equity approach. The Edwards-Bell-Ohlson (EBO) model (Edwards and Bell, 1961; Ohlson, 1989, 1995)
is obtained by choosing i=ke, dt=equity cash flow, and r∗=ROE (therefore y(~r∗) is the book value of equity.
See also Arnold, 2005). Ferna´ndez’s (2002) Created Shareholder Value (CSV) is found by picking yt(~r∗)=V et (~r
∗
is automatically determined by eq. (2)) and i=ke. An equity version of the cfroi is what we here name Cash
Flow Return On Equity (cfroe), which is the internal rate of return obtained by equating to zero the sum of the
discounted equity cash flows, i.e. dt=equity cash flow (y(~r∗) is automatically determined by the usual recursive
equation). The resulting RI model is found by selecting i=ke.
2 The lost-capital paradigm
In this section we revisit the Systemic Value Added model, relabelling it the “lost-capital paradigm”. In Magni
(2000a,b, 2001a,b, 2003) attention is drawn on shareholders’ wealth. It is assumed that, in case of acceptance of
the project, shareholders reinvest the equity cash flows at the cost of capital i (this is the standard assumption
of the NPV rule). Therefore, in each period shareholders’ wealth is a portfolio of the project and the proceeds of
the reinvestments. The all-comprehensive profit (inclusive of income from the project and earned interest from
the reinvestments) is r∗yt−1(~r∗) + iCt−1, where Ct−1 is the value, at time t−1, of the reinvestment proceeds,
which evolves according to the dynamic system Ct = Ct−1(1 + i) + dt. Suppose, instead, that the project is not
undertaken and the amount d0 is invested at the cost of capital: Letting Ct be its compounded value at time t
(C0=C0+d0 is the initial investor’s wealth), wealth evolves according to the dynamic system Ct = Ct−1(1 + i),
so that the income is iCt−1. The residual income is given by the difference of the two alternative incomes, and
is called Systemic Value Added because it is deduced from the two dynamic systems:
Systemic Value Added =
(
r∗yt−1(~r∗) + iCt−1
)− iCt−1. (6)
This residual income consists of three parts: r∗yt−1(~r∗) represents income from investment in the business, iCt−1
represents earned interest from reinvestment proceeds, iCt−1 is the income that shareholder forgo if project is
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undertaken. Note that, in Magni’s model, Ct−1 is part of the investor’s actual wealth, whereas Ct−1 is a foregone
capital. We here revisit this paradigm by adopting an arbitrage-type perspective, which enables us to dispense
with the reinvestment assumption of interim cash flows. To this end, one can construct a twin asset that replicates
the project’s payoff. This is accomplished by assuming that d0 is invested at the cost of capital and that, at the
end of each period, cash flow dt is withdrawn from the asset’s balance. So doing, the cash-flow stream of the
project is replicated and, at the end of the n-th period, the residual capital yn(i) is obtained as an arbitrage
gain (or loss). In other terms, the two alternatives are represented by a double application of eq. (2) with two
different IDFs: The first one is an arbitrary vector ~r = (r∗1 , r
∗
2 , . . . , r
∗
n) such that yn(~r
∗) = 0, the second one is
the vector of the costs of capital (which, we remind, are here assumed to be constant: ~ı = (i, i, . . . , i)):
yt(~r∗) = yt−1(~r∗)(1 + r∗t )− dt (7)
yt(i) = yt−1(i)(1 + i)− dt; (8)
the first dynamic system represents the evolution of the actual outstanding balance, the second one represents
the path the balance would follow if investors invested their funds at the cost of capital while withdrawing, at
each period, the cash flow dt from the balance. Under this interpretation, yt(~r∗) is the actual capital employed
by investors, whereas yt(i) is the capital that would be (or have been) employed if, at time 0, investors decided
(or had decided) to invest funds at the cost of capital. The amount yt(i) is therefore the capital sacrificed by
investors: The lost capital. Thus, r∗t yt−1(~r
∗) represents the actual income in the t-th period, whereas iyt−1(i)
represents the lost income. The difference between actual income and lost income gives the lost-capital (LC)
residual income.
Definition 2. The lost-capital paradigm is formally represented by the set {ξat } such that
ξat = r
∗
t yt−1(~r
∗)− i yt−1(i) (9)
Remark 4. Eq. (9) is just eq. (6) disguised in a different shape, given that Ct−Ct = yt(i) for every t (see Magni,
2000a, 2003, 2005): The lost capital may therefore be decomposed into an actual capital Ct and a foregone capital
Ct. In his papers Magni shows that the lost capital is just the outstanding capital of a shadow project whose
standard residual income coincides with the lost-capital residual income of project ~d.1
Remark 5. Eq. (9) may be conveniently derived from an accounting perspective. Consider two mutually exclusive
courses of action: Investing funds at the corporate rate of return, as opposed to investing funds at the corporate
cost of capital. The two alternative courses of action give rise to two alternative clean-surplus type relations:
dt = r∗t yt−1(~r
∗)−∆ yt(~r∗)
dt = i yt−1(i)−∆ yt(i).
Subtracting the latter from the former, we have ∆ yt(~r∗) − ∆ yt(i) = ξat . Given that depreciation is capital’s
variation changed in sign, the latter equality informs that periodic performance is positive if and only if the
depreciation of the firm’s capital is higher upon investing funds at the cost of capital rather than at the corporate
actual rate of return.
Remark 6. The LC residual income is linked to depreciation in two different senses:
1In this paper, we do not focus on this interpretation for reasons of space. See Magni (2000a, 2004, 2005, 2006).
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- depreciation through time: eq. (2) and eq. (9) imply
ξat = [yt−1(i)− yt(i)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
rejection
− [yt−1(~r∗)− yt(~r∗)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
acceptance
(10)
where each depreciation charge refers to time, in the two alternative cases of project rejection and accep-
tance, respectively
- depreciation through use: eq. (10) may be rewritten as
ξat = [yt−1(i)− yt−1(~r∗)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
time t−1
− [yt(i)− yt(~r∗)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
time t
(11)
where each depreciation charge refers to different uses of the funds, at time t−1 and time t respectively. Scott
(1953) observes that “economists cannot afford to lump together, as “depreciation”, changes in present value
caused by the passage of time, and by use” (p. 371). In fact, the LC paradigm does enable one to lump together
depreciation through time and depreciation through use.
Whenever a metric in the classical paradigm is constructed, a corresponding metric in the LC paradigm is
univocally determined. Let L the mathematical operator that transforms standard metrics in LC metrics: L :
xat → ξat . If ξat is the image of xat via L, i.e. ξat = L(xat ), then ξat is said to be the LC-companion of xat . For
example, the LC companions of EVA, EBO, and CSV are, respectively,
L(EVAt) = ROAt ·Blt − wacc · yt(wacc)
L(EBOt) = ROEt ·Bet − ke · yt(ke)
L(CSVt) =
r∗t d0 − ke d0 t = 1ke V et − ke yt(ke) t > 1
where r∗1=(V
e
1 + d1 − d0)/d0 (see also Table 2 and the numerical example in the Appendix).
3 Valuation and aggregation property
This section shows that a cumulation of past residual incomes is intrinsically incorporated in the definition of
LC residual income, which enables one to show an important aggregation property of LC residual income.
Proposition 1. The lost-capital RI is equal to the sum of the standard RI plus accumulated interest on past
standard RIs:
ξa1 = x
a
1 and ξ
a
t = x
a
t + i
t−1∑
k=1
xaku
t−1−k for t > 1 (12)
where u := 1 + i.
Proof. The first equation is obvious, given that y0(~r∗) = y0(i). Using the usual recursive (clean surplus) relation
dk=yk−1(~r∗)(1 + r∗k)−yk(~r∗) one finds
yt−1(i) = y0(i)ut−1 −
t−1∑
k=1
dku
t−1−k = y0(i)ut−1 −
t−1∑
k=1
(
yk−1(~r∗)(1 + r∗k)− yk(~r∗)
)
ut−1−k.
Upon algebraic manipulations, yt−1(i) = yt−1(~r∗)− xa1ut−2 − xa2ut−3 − . . .− xat−1. Therefore, ξat = r∗t yt−1(~r∗)−
iyt−1(i), which is equal to r∗t yt−1(~r
∗)− i(yt−1(~r∗)− xa1ut−2 − xa2ut−3 + . . .− xat−1).
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Remark 7. Using induction on eq. (12) it is easily proved that
t∑
k=1
ξak =
t∑
k=1
xat u
t−k for every t ≥ 1 (13)
(see Magni, 2005, Lemma 2.4 and Theorem 2.2, for a generalization of eqs. (12) and (13)). Applying both
eqs. (12) and (13) one finds
ξat = x
a
t + i
t−1∑
k=1
ξak for every t > 1 (14)
which expresses the LC residual income in terms of cumulations of past LC residual incomes.
Eq. (13) implies that projects and firms can be appraised through the LC paradigm by reversing the role
of summing and discounting: The standard-type residual income model is tied to the Net Present Value via
a discount-and-sum procedure, whereas the LC paradigm employs a sum-and-discount procedure. Letting
v:=u−1=(1 + i)−1 and reminding that
∑n
k=1 x
a
kv
k=NPV, if one picks t=n in eq. (13) one obtains
vn
n∑
k=1
ξak = v
n
n∑
k=1
xaku
n−k =
n∑
k=1
vkxak = NPV. (15)
Residual incomes are first summed, and then discounted: The reverse of the classical procedure. In terms of Net
Final Value one gets, at time n,
Nn = NPV(1 + i)n =
n∑
k=1
ξak . (16)
The Net Final Value is given by the uncompounded sum of all residual incomes ξat . This means that the LC
residual income is additively coherent.2 Note also that, replacing r with i in eq. (4), the terminal lost capital
is just the project’s Net Final Value (changed in sign): yn(i) = −Nn. Thus, the terminal lost capital may be
found by summing the past residual incomes: yn(i) = −
∑n
t=1 ξ
a
t . The additive coherence, far from being a mere
elegant formal property, unfolds the powerful property of income aggregation, as opposed to discounting. That
is, equations (15) and (16) show that capital budgeting problems may be solved by dispensing with forecasting
each and every cash flow and, in addition, by dispensing with forecasting each and every residual income. If the
lost-capital paradigm is used, only the grand total residual income that a firm (project) releases within the fixed
horizon is relevant. One does not have to worry about timing. This additive coherence reflects the aggregation
property of accounting. Given that NPV=V0−d0 with d0=y0(~r∗), one can express the firm’s market value as a
function of the outstanding capital and the grand total residual income:
V0 = y0(~r∗) + vn
n∑
k=1
ξak . (17)
Picking yk(~r∗)=Bek and i=ke one may write
V e0 = B
e
0 +
1
(1 + ke)n
n∑
k=1
abnormal earnings. (18)
Lost-capital abnormal earnings aggregate in a value sense and prediction in each of the following years is not
needed. Value is derived from knowledge about total abnormal earnings in a span of n years, no matter how
2See Magni (2009a) for the property of antisymmetry of the LC residual income and its implications.
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they distribute across periods. One may estimate an average abnormal earning for a future span of years and
multiply by the number of years to obtain the Net Final Value. By discounting back and adding the equity book
value one gets the equity market value. Section 6 provides a generalization of eq. (18) when the analysis starts
at time t>0.
Remark 8. The Net Final Value Nn may be reexpressed in a further fashion, where no capitalization process is
involved for the standard RIs, while the lost-capital RIs are only linearly compounded. Expanding eq. (14),
ξa1 = x
a
1
ξa2 = x
a
2 + iξ
a
1
ξa3 = x
a
3 + i(ξ
a
1 + ξ
a
2 )
. . . = . . .
ξan = x
a
n + i(ξ
a
1 + ξ
a
2 + . . . ξ
a
n−1) (19)
and, summing by column,
n∑
t=1
ξat =
n∑
t=1
xat +
n∑
t=1
i(n− t)ξat . (20)
which implies Nn=
∑n
t=1 x
a
t +
∑n
t=1 i(n−t)ξat , owing to
∑n
t=1 ξ
a
t =Nn. The project’s Net Final Value may therefore
be viewed as a double sum of residual incomes: A sum of uncompounded conventional RIs plus a sum of linearly
compounded LC residual incomes.
Remark 9. Eq. (12) is significant for management compensation purposes. It tells us that any LC measure may
be reinterpreted in standard terms. An LC performance metric may be interpreted as an index ξat constructed
from the standard paradigm on the basis of (not only current but also) past (standard) performances: ξat =
ξat (x
a
1 , x
a
2 , . . . , x
a
t ). In a compensation plan based on the function ξ
a
t (where compensation is increasing with
respect to ξat ) performances are amplified with respect to the usual standard metrics: past positive performances
play an insurance role against current negative performance: if xat < 0 and x
a
k > 0 for 1 ≤ k ≤ t−1, one
finds ξat > x
a
t and, possibly, ξ
a
t > 0 > x
a
t ; past negative performance play a penalty role for current positive
performances: if xat > 0 and x
a
k < 0 for 1 ≤ k ≤ t−1, one finds ξat < xat , and, possibly, ξat < 0 < xat (in case the
sequence {xak} has nonhomogenous sign, the net effect depends on the relative weight of positive past performances
on negative past performances). The behaviour of an LC metric should therefore attract value-based management
scholars, who often recommend a functional dependence of compensation on past performances in the form of
cumulation of residual incomes (e.g. Stewart, 1991; Ehrbar, 1998; Young and O’Byrne, 2001): a compensation
plan should somehow consider capitalization of previous residual incomes. Equation (12) incorporates it in the
definition of residual income itself. An LC-based compensation plan should in principle imply a less myopic
management’s behaviour, for (i) managers are rewarded on the basis of two benchmarks: the rate of return
they should guarantee (profitability) and the capital they should reach (capital accumulation) in a given period,
(ii) managers are aware that their current performance reverberate on the future: past performances will not
be “forgotten”, (iii) dependance of compensation on past performances is nontrivial, so that managers will
have problems in gaming the measure. It is also worth underlining that any LC metric may be viewed as
a standard metric with an adjusted cost of capital: from eqs. (5) and (9) one finds ξat = yt(r
∗
t − jt) with
jt = i+ i · [yt−1(i)− yt−1(~r∗))/yt−1(~r∗)]: the benchmark for a positive management compensation is given by the
return rate i plus the return on the relative excess capital (which may be positive or negative). If, for example,
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i=0.1, yt−1(~r∗)=80, yt−1(i)=90, the capital invested in case of rejection of ~a would have been greater than the
capital actually invested by a 12.5%=(90-80)/80. This means that a 10% on that 12.5% could have been earned,
so that an additional 1.25% would have accrued. Therefore, for a positive performance to occur, the period
internal rate must be greater than 10%; in particular, the threshold level is i=11.25%=10% +1.25%.
4 Ohlson’s Abnormal Earnings Growth, O’Byrne’s EVA improve-
ment, and LC residual income
The notion of Abnormal Earnings Growth (AEG), recently proposed by Ohlson (2005) as a method of firm
valuation, is arousing interest among management accounting scholars (see Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth, 2005;
Penman, 2005; Brief, 2007). AEG is the difference between two (standard) consecutive residual earnings (equity
perspective). This very concept has been previously used and studied for value-based management purposes
by O’Byrne (1996, 1997) and Young and O’Byrne (2001). The so-called EVA improvement is just the AEG
in an entity perspective. In their 2001 book, Young and O’Byrne illustrate a numerical example (p. 29) where
the future value of EVA improvement is calculated period by period.3 They explain the way they compute the
future value of EVA improvement as follows: “We do this by multiplying the prior-year future value by 1.10
(1+the WACC of 10 percent) and then adding current-year excess EVA improvement” (p. 40). Formalizing their
algorithm and denoting with Ft the future value of EVA improvement,
Ft = Ft−1(1 + i) + EVAt − EVAt−1. (21)
Let us generalize the above equation by replacing EVA with the generic residual income xat so as to redefine AEG
to include both equity and entity perspective:
zt−1 = xat − xat−1 t = 1, 2, . . . , n (22)
with z0:=xa1 . The future value of cumulated AEGs may be formalized as
Ft = Ft−1(1 + i) + zt−1. (23)
We may interpret the above equation as representing the growth in the “AEG account”. As the account starts
from zero (at the beginning of the project, no residual income has been generated), it is natural to take the
boundary condition F0:=0. The account grows by a normal return iFt−1 plus an abnormal return zt−1.4. Using
3Rigorously speaking, the authors compute the future value of the Excess EVA improvement but, given their assump-
tions of no excess future growth value, excess EVA improvement equals EVA improvement (see O’Byrne, 1997, for relations
among excess EVA improvement, future growth value, and excess return).
4The notion of future value of cumulated AEGs is quite natural, given that AEG measures the growth of abnormal
earnings (for this reason GAE might be a better acronym. See Brief, 2007, p. 433)
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eq. (23), one finds
F1 = 0(1 + i) + z0
F2 = z0(1 + i) + z1
F3 = z0(1 + i)2 + z1(1 + i) + z2
... =
...
Ft = z0(1 + i)t−1 + z1(1 + i)t−2 + z2(1 + i)t−3 + . . .+ zt−1. (24)
We may then prove the following
Proposition 2. The future value of cumulated AEGs is equal to the lost-capital residual income
ξat = Ft =
t∑
k=1
zk−1ut−k (25)
Proof. Reminding that z0=xa1 and using eqs. (22) and (24), simple manipulations lead to
Ft = xa1u
t−1 + (xa2 − xa1)ut−2 + . . .+ (xat − xat−1)
Ft = ixa1u
t−2 + ixa2u
t−3 + . . .+ ixat−1 + x
a
t
Ft = xat + i
t−1∑
k=1
xaku
t−1−k
From eq. (12), xat + i
∑t−1
k=1 x
a
ku
t−1−k=ξat , so that Ft = ξ
a
t .
Remark 10. Young and O’Byrne (2001, p. 42) illustrate a numerical example where the notions of Adjusted
Invested Capital and Adjusted EVA are introduced. In the example, they assume earnings=dividends. It is easy
to show that the two notions correspond to the notions of lost capital and LC residual income. The recurrence
equations for the two notions, inferred from the authors’ explanations at p. 42 and the numbers in the Table, are
as follows:
AICt = AICt−1 −AEt
AEt = Earningst − wacc ·AICt−1. (26)
where wacc coincides with the cost of equity, given their assumption of zero debt. The two equations yield
AICt = AICt−1 − Earningst + wacc ·AICt−1
= AICt−1 · (1 + wacc)− Earningst (27)
If one assumes Earningst=dividends, eq. (27) corresponds to the recurrence equation for yt(wacc) (see eq.(8)), so
that AICt=yt(wacc). As a result, AEt in eq. (26) is equal to the lost-capital EVA as well as to the future value
of cumulated AEGs: AEt=L(EVAt)=Ft.
Remark 11. Reminding that y0(~r∗)=d0=B0, eqs. (17) and (25) imply
V0 = B0 + NPV = B0 + vn
n∑
t=1
ξat = B0 + v
n
n∑
t=1
Ft
= B0 + vn
n∑
t=1
t∑
k=1
zk−1ut−k = B0 +
n∑
t=1
t∑
k=1
zk−1vn−t+k (28)
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Disentangling the double sum in eq. (28), one finds∑n
t=1
∑t
k=1 v
n−t+kzk−1 =z0vn
+z0vn−1 +z1vn
+z0vn−2 +z1vn−1 +z2vn
...
...
...
+z0v +z1v2 +z2v3 +z3v4 . . . +zn−2vn−1 +zn−1vn
The t-th column of the above sum may be written as
∑n
k=t zt−1v
k. Summing the n columns,
∑n
t=1
∑n
k=t zt−1v
k =∑n
t=1
∑t
k=1 zk−1v
n−t+k. Hence,
V0 = B0 +
n∑
t=1
n∑
k=t
zt−1vk. (29)
Therefore, the lost-capital paradigm gives us the opportunity of viewing AEG with the book value as the anchoring
value.5 The generalization for infinite-lived firms is straightforward:
V0 = B0 + lim
n→∞
n∑
t=1
n∑
k=t
zt−1vk
= B0 +
∞∑
t=1
∞∑
k=t
zt−1vk = B0 +
∞∑
t=1
zt−1
vt
1− v
= B0 +
1
i
∞∑
t=1
zt−1vt−1 = B0 +
z0
i
+
1
i
∞∑
t=1
ztv
t. (31)
The latter is just the fundamental EVA equation. O’Byrne (1996, p. 117) introduces this equation by making
use of Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) investment opportunities approach to valuation; Miller and Modigliani’s
approach is substantiated in their equation (12), where they include the excess profit generated by the increase
in physical assets. Such an excess profit, in the language of EVA, is just the EVA improvement.6
5 Tying lost capital to value creation
The Net Present Value of an asset is commonly defined as the difference between the market value of the asset
and the capital infused into it at a certain time. This implies that the capital infused may defined as follows:
5If one is willing to highlight the first-period earnings as anchoring value (as is done in Ohlson, 2005), one finds
n∑
t=1
vtzt−1 =
n∑
t=1
vtxat − v(
n∑
t=1
vtxat ) + v
n+1xan = N0 − vN0 + vn+1xan = ivN0 + vn+1xan
where N0:=NPV. Reminding that x
a
n+1=0 (the project ends at time n), so that zn=−xan, one finds
N0 =
(1 + i)
i
(
n∑
t=1
vtzt−1 + v
n+1zn
)
=
1
i
(
n∑
t=1
vt−1zt−1 + v
nzn
)
=
1
i
(
n∑
t=0
vtzt
)
.
Using the fact that z0=x
a
1=(r
∗
1 − i)y0(~r∗) with r∗1y0(~r∗) being the first-period income, one gets
V0 = N0 + y0(~r
∗) =
r∗1
i
y0(~r
∗) +
(
n∑
t=1
vtzt
)
=
Income1
i
+
1
i
(
n∑
t=1
vtzt
)
. (30)
6An equivalent formulation of Miller and Modigliani’s equation (12) is anticipated in Bodenhorn (1959) and in Walter
(1956).
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Definition 3. At each time t, the capital infused by an investor into an asset is given by the difference between
the market value of the asset and its Net Present Value.
Armed with the above definition, we show the following
Proposition 3. For every t, the lost capital yt(i) is the capital infused into the project at time t:
yt(i) = Vt −Nt. (32)
Proof. Reminding that y0(~r):=d0 for any return rate rt, using eq. (8) one finds
yt(i) = d0ut −
t∑
k=1
dku
t−k; (33)
however, Vt =
∑n
k=t+1 dku
t−k and Nt=ut·NPV=
∑n
k=1 dku
t−k − d0ut, whence
Vt −Nt = d0ut −
t∑
k=1
dku
t−k. (34)
Eqs. (33) and (34) coincide.
While the notion of lost capital has been previously introduced as a foregone capital, Proposition 3 allows us
to reinterpret it as the capital infused by investors into the firm at the beginning of each period: The time-t
Net Present Value Nt just measures by how much the (market) value of the firm exceeds (if positive) the capital
infused into the business. Such a capital is not yt(~r∗), as could erroneously be expected: It is just the lost capital.
If one deducts yt(~r∗) from Vt, one obtains what may be called the generalized Market Value Added (gMVA). If
book values are selected for ~y, the gMVA boils down to the well-known Market Value Added (MVA).
Nt = Vt − yt(i) (35)
gMVAt = Vt − yt(~r∗) (36)
Proposition 4. For every t≥1, the difference between the Net Present Value and the Market Value Added is
given by the (uncompounded) past lost-capital residual incomes:
Nt −MVAt =
t∑
k=1
ξak (37)
Proof. From eq. (10) we have
t∑
k=1
ξak =
t∑
k=1
[yk−1(i)− yk(i)]− [yk−1(~r∗)− yk(~r∗)]
= yt(~r∗)− yt(i). (38)
Picking yt(~r∗) = Bet , eq. (36) becomes MVAt = Vt − Bet . Deducting the latter from eq. (35) and using eq. (38)
one gets eq. (37).
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Proposition 4 says that if one uses the Market Value Added to measure value creation, one forgets the past
residual incomes. In other words, value creation is obtained by adding to the firm’s Market Value Added the
LC residual incomes generated in the past. This very Proposition highlights the major role played by the LC
residual income as a measure of excess variation of Net Present Value upon Market Value Added.
Corollary 1. The LC residual income is the difference between NPV’s variation and MVA’s variation:
ξat = ∆Nt −∆MVAt. (39)
Proof. From eq. (37) we have Nt−1−MVAt−1=
∑t−1
k=1 ξ
a
t . Subtracting the latter from eq. (37) one gets eq. (39).
Proposition 5. The firm’s outstanding balance is given by the sum of the capital infused and the (uncompounded)
past lost-capital residual incomes:
yt(~r∗) = yt(i) +
t∑
k=1
ξak . (40)
Proof. Straightforward from eq. (38)
The above Proposition provides the relation among the outstanding balance, the lost capital and past residual
incomes. The relation holds for any yt(~r∗), in particular for yt(~r∗) = Bt, so one is given the link connecting book
value, lost capital and past residual incomes.
Propositions 3-5 show that the investors’ commitment to the business is the lost capital, not the actual
outstanding capital, and, in particular, not the book value. The relation between yt(~r∗) and yt(i) unveils the
relation between the MVA and the NPV. At each date, the Net Present Value Nt is an overall measure taking
account of the entire life of the project. Therefore, it comprises both a forward-looking and a backward-looking
perspective. In contrast, the Market Value Added erases the past and limits its perspective to prospective cash
flows: In its view the firm incorporates (the project begins) at time t. Net Present Value and Market Value
Added may be seen as different ways of splitting the market value of equity: From eqs. (35) and (36),
Vt = Nt + yt(i) (41)
Vt = gMVAt + yt(~r∗). (42)
Eq. (41) determines an unambiguous partition of Vt, given a cash-flow ~d and a cost of capital i. Eq. (42) originates
a set of infinite partitions, one for any choice of ~r ∗.7
6 O’Hanlon and Peasnell’s approach and the lost capital
This section shows that the approach of O’Hanlon and Peasnell (2002) is consistent with the LC paradigm and
proposes lost-capital splitting identities. In their paper, O’Hanlon and Peasnell (OP) introduce the notion of
Excess Value Created (EVC), which is based on the notion of “unrecovered capital”. They define EVC as the
difference
EV Ct = V et − U0t (43)
where U0t is the unrecovered capital: U
0
t =d0(1 + ke)
t −∑tk=1 dk(1 + ke)t−k. Owing to eq. (33), the unrecovered
capital is just the capital lost by shareholders: U0t =yt(ke). The EVC, which OP acknowledge as analogous to
7To be rigorous, one should write gMVAt(~r
∗) rather than gMVAt, because the generalized MVA changes as ~r ∗ changes.
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Young and O’Byrne’s (2001) excess return, actually coincides with the time-t Net Present Value Nt, and eq. (43)
is the equity version of our eq. (35): U0t =yt(ke) and Nt=EVCt. In their Proposition 1 (p. 233), OP show that
the book value of equity may be written as the sum of the unrecovered capital and the compounded past residual
incomes, and in their Proposition 2 (pp. 233-234) they show that the EVC equals the sum of compounded residual
incomes and the Market Value Added. Using our symbols, OP show that
Bet = yt(ke) +
t∑
k=1
xat (1 + ke)
t−k (44)
Nt =
t∑
k=1
xak(1 + ke)
t−k +
n∑
k=t+1
xak(1 + ke)
t−k (45)
It is worth noting that our Propositions 5 and 4 are, respectively, the LC-companions of OP (2002)’s Propositions
1 and 2. In particular, to pass from eq. (40) to eq. (44) and from eq. (37) to eq. (45) one just has to use eq. (13)
with i=ke and r∗=ROE. However, the following Propositions directly tie the LC paradigm to value creation,
dispensing with the notion of market value added (and, therefore, dispensing with the standard RI models).
Proposition 6. For every t ≥ 1, the time-t Net Present Value is given by the sum of all LC residual incomes,
discounted at time t:
Nt = vn−t
n∑
k=1
ξak
Proof. We have Nt=vn−t
∑n
k=1 x
a
ku
n−k. Using eq. (13) with t=n the thesis follows.
Consider now the project generated by the truncation of ~d from time 0 to time t−1, or, which is the same,
generated by the sum of subprojects ~dt+1, ~dt+2, . . . ~dn (with ~r=~r∗). Denote this project by ~dt,n. Then,
~dt,n =
n∑
k=t+1
~dk = (0, 0, . . . , 0,−yt(~r∗), dt+1, dt+2, . . . , dn) ∈ Rn+1.
In other words, ~dt,n is the future part of project ~d. Letting
~d0,t =
t∑
k=1
~dk = (−d0, d1, d2, . . . , dt + yt(~r∗), 0, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Rn+1
be the first part of project ~d, then project ~d is the sum of the two parts: ~d = ~d0,t + ~dt,n.
The following Proposition holds.
Proposition 7. The Net Present Value of project ~d is decomposed into two shares: (i) the sum of the LC residual
incomes of project ~d’s first part, and (ii) the discounted sum of the LC residual incomes of project ~d’s future part:
Nt =
t∑
k=1
ξak + v
n−t
n∑
k=t+1
ξa
k,(~dt,n)
(46)
where ξa
k,(~dt,n)
is the LC residual income from ~dt,n.
Proof. Project ~dt,n begins at time t with initial outstanding capital equal to yt(~r∗). The initial boundary
condition is yt(~r∗)=y◦t (i), where y
◦
t (i) denotes the initial lost capital of project ~dt,n; its evolution is given by
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y◦k(i) = y
◦
k−1(i)(1 + i)− dk for k > t. Therefore, any result previously found for project ~d holds for project ~dt,n
as well. In particular, eq. (13) applied to project ~dt,n becomes
τ∑
k=t+1
ξa
k,(~dt,n)
=
τ∑
k=t+1
xa
k,(~dt,n)
uτ−k for every τ > t
where xa
k,(~dt,n)
is the standard RI for project ~dt,n. However, the right-hand side holds for both ~d and ~dt,n,
because cash flows, outstanding capitals, rates of return of the two projects coincide (~dt,n is the future part of ~d).
Therefore, xa
k,(~dt,n)
= xak. This implies
∑τ
k=t+1 ξ
a
k,(~dt,n)
=
∑τ
k=t+1 x
a
ku
τ−k for every τ > t. Picking τ=n, and using
the fact that vn−t
∑n
k=t+1 x
a
ku
n−k=gMVAt, one gets vn−t
∑n
k=t+1 ξ
a
k,(~dt,n)
= gMVAt. Eq. (46) is finally derived
by using eq. (37) with gMVAt replacing MVAt.8
Proposition 7 says that the Net Present Value (the Excess Value Created, in OP’s words) is reached by
summing the lost-capital RIs of the first part of ~d and by discounting the aggregated lost-capital RIs of the future
part of ~d. Picking i=ke and r∗=ROE in eq. (46) one finds the equivalent of OP’s eq. (45) expressed in genuine
LC terms. The same Proposition induces a generalization of eq. (17). Using the equality gMVAt=Vt − yt(~r∗)
and the fact that gMVAt=vn−t
∑n
k=t+1 ξ
a
k,(~dt,n)
(see proof of Proposition 7), one finds
Vt = yt(~r∗) + vn−t
n∑
k=t+1
ξa
k,(~dt,n)
. (47)
Choosing the equity perspective and selecting book values as outstanding capitals, the above equality becomes
V et = B
e
t +
1
(1 + ke)n−t
n∑
k=t+1
ξa
k,(~dt,n)
for every t. (48)
Setting t=0 one finds back eq. (17), given that ~d0,n = ~d, which implies ξak,(~d0,n)=ξ
a
k for all k. Eq. (48) says that to
get the equity market value one does not need to forecast dividends nor residual incomes: Only the total amount
of prospective residual incomes is relevant.
7 User cost, lost-capital residual income and Keynesian Excess Profit
In 1936, Keynes introduces the notion of user cost in The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.
Referring to an entrepreneur, user cost is defined as the difference between “the value of his capital equipment
at the end of the period . . . and . . . the value it might have had at the end of the period if he had refrained from
using it” (Keynes, 1967, p. 66). The same concept is investigated by Coase (1968), who relabels it “depreciation
through use”. User cost is equal to G′−G where “G′ is the value of the entrepreneurial stock and equipment had
they not been used and G is their value after use” (Scott, 1953, p. 370). User cost therefore compares two different
choices: “The choice between . . . using a machine for a purpose and using it for another” (Coase, 1968, p. 123)
and the result represents a depreciation in the value of the asset. Such a depreciation represents the “opportunity
cost of putting goods and resources to a certain use” (Scott, 1953, p. 369), and is therefore an economic measure
of “the opportunity lost when another decision is carried through” (Scott, 1953, p. 375, italics added). In this
section we apply this concept to the situation where the entrepreneur may either put his resources in asset ~d or
8Obviously, eq. (37) does hold if MVAt is replaced by gMVAt.
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invest them in an asset yielding return at the market rate i. To compute G and G′, one must calculate “the
present value of the net receipts . . . by discounting them at a rate of interest” (Coase, 1968, p. 123). This “rate of
discount coincides with that in the market” (Scott, 1953, p. 378). Using the arbitrage-type description given in
section 2, if project is undertaken the cash-flow stream is (−d0, d1, d2, . . . , dn); if the entrepreneur abstains from
investing in the project, his cash-flow stream is (−d0, d1, d2, . . . , dn + yn(i)). In the former case, the value of the
entrepreneurial stock at time t is G =
∑n
k=t+1 dkv
k−t. In the latter case, it is G′ =
∑n
k=t+1 dkv
k−t + yn(i)vn−t.
User cost is therefore
G′ −G =
n∑
k=t+1
dkv
k−t + yn(i)vn−t −
n∑
k=t+1
dkv
k−t = yn(i)vn−t (49)
which, as Keynes acknowledges, represents “the discounted value of the additional prospective yield which would
be obtained at some later date” (Keynes, 1967, p. 70). In other terms, reminding that the Net Final Value is the
final lost capital changed in sign (Nn = −yn(i)), user cost is the time-t NPV (changed in sign): G′ −G = −Nt.
It is worth noting that G=Vt by definition of market value. Also, G′=yt(i). To prove the latter, just note that,
using eq. (4) with r=i, one gets d0un −
∑t
k=1 dku
n−k=
∑n
k=t+1 dku
n−k + yn(i). Dividing by un−t,
d0u
t −
t∑
k=1
dku
t−k =
n∑
k=t+1
dkv
k−t + yn(i)vn−t. (50)
The left-hand side is yt(i), the right-hand side is G′. Hence, user cost is equal to G′−G=yt(i)−Vt. Consider now
the depreciation through time of user cost, which is (yt−1(i)−Vt−1)− (yt(i)−Vt): The latter is just a particular
case of eq. (11) where Vt is chosen as the outstanding capital yt(~r). The notion of lost-capital residual income
is then just a generalization of the keynesian excess profit which is implicitly originated by user cost. We have
then the following:
Definition 4. The Keynesian Excess Profit (KEP) is the subclass of lost-capital RIs generated by the choice of
market values as outstanding capitals, so that yt(~r∗)=Vt, for t = 1, . . . , n− 1.
User cost is the change in the value of the asset due to a different use of it, and, in turn, the KEP is the change
in the value of user cost due to time. The notion of user cost enables us to present residual income in terms of
periodic variation of user cost.
The following Proposition shows that the KEP enjoys the important property of goal congruence: every
residual income has the same sign as the NPV (see Martin et al., 2003)
Proposition 8. The KEP has the same sign as the net value Nt.
Proof. Proposition 3 implies
ξat = r
∗
t yt−1(~r
∗)− i (Vt−1 −Nt−1). (51)
Definition 4 implies ~r = (V1+d1−d0d0 , i, i, . . . i), so that eq. (51) becomes
KEPt =
i
(
Vt−1 − d0
)
+
(
Vt−1 − d0
)
if t = 1
i
(
Vt−1 − yt−1(i)
)
if t > 1
(52)
where we have used the equalities V0−N0=d0 and V1 + d1=V0(1 + i). Therefore, given that Nt=Vt−yt(i) for all
t, we have, for t> 1, KEPt>0 if and only if Nt−1>0; as for t=1, we have KEP1>0 if and only if N1>0, given
that N1=N0(1 + i)=(V0 − d0)(1 + i).
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The above Proposition compellingly proposes a subclass of RI models that always signal a positive residual income
if and only if Net Present Value is positive, i.e if and only if value exceeds capital infused into the business. Note
that the uncompounded sum of all the KEPs is equal to the project’s Net Final Value Nn9 and that the goal
congruence property holds irrespective of the sign of the cash flows.10
Remark 12. The significance of the LC paradigm is also appreciated in terms of evolutions of NPV and gMVA.
From eq. (32) and eq. (52) we find
Nt =
KEPt if t = 1Nt−1 + KEPt if t > 1. (53)
The KEP is the periodic addition to the Net Present Value or, equivalently, the KEP is just the RI model
generated by the NPV. Using induction upon eq. (53),
Nt =
t∑
k=1
KEPk. (54)
The above equation and eq. (37) imply MVAt=0. This is obvious, given that in the KEP model the outstanding
balance yt(~r∗) equals the market value for all t≥1 . Eq. (54) gives some insights on the Net Present Value. Having
previously found that the NPV may be written as sum of future LC residual incomes and past LC residual incomes
(eq. (46)), we have now rewritten the NPV by using only past LC residual incomes. This result shows that NPV
and LC paradigm are strictly connected, and that the use of the KEP-class enables one us to dismiss the future
LC residual incomes.
8 Created Shareholder Value and Net Economic Income
The LC perspective gives us the opportunity of conjoining two seemingly disparate metrics in a unified view,
introduced in a value-based management book and in a corporate finance book, respectively. The former is the
Net Economic Income (NEI) and its use is suggested by Drukarczyk and Schueler (2000) for managerial purposes.
The latter is the Created Shareholder Value (CSV) and is fostered by Ferna´ndez’s (2002) for measuring value
creation. It is easy to see that NEI and the LC-companion of CSV belong to the class of KEP metrics. As for
NEI, the authors define current invested capital ICt as ICt = ICτ (1 +wacc)t−τ −
∑t
k=τ+1NCFk(1 +wacc)
t−τ ,
where τ < t is the time of the initial investment and NCFk is the free cash flow. Evidently, setting τ=0, ICt is
just yt(i), and i=wacc (which also means that their notion of invested capital coincides with the entity version
of O’Hanlon and Peasnell’s unrecovered capital). Net Economic Income is defined as
NEIt = NCFt + (MVt −MVt−1)− wacc · ICt−1 (55)
with MVt being the market value of the firm. It is evident that this perspective is consistent with the LC
paradigm and that NEI is just an instantiation of the KEP class in an entity approach:
Proposition 9. Net Economic Income is an entity-approach version of KEP.
9This result just derives from eq. (16).
10Grinyer (1985, 1987, 1995) and Rogerson (1997) present a goal congruent measure under the assumption that all
cash flows have the same sign. However, “this latter constraint is very unrealistic as many positive NPV projects have a
mixture of positive and negative cash flows throughout the project’s life.” (Martin et al., 2003, pp. 20–21).
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Proof. Pick i=wacc and V=V l in eq. (52), so that
KEPt =

(
V lt−1 − d0
)
+ wacc · (V lt−1 − d0) if t = 1
wacc · (V lt−1 − yt−1(wacc)) if t > 1.
Therefore eqs. (55) and (52) coincide, given that wacc · V lt−1=NCFt−1+(MVt −MVt−1).
Net Economic Income is therefore the KEP from the point of view of all capital providers. As for Ferna´ndez’s
metric, it lies within the boundaries of the conventional paradigm, as seen in section 1. The author suggests the
choice yt(~r∗)=V et , t = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1, so that
CSVt =
d0(r∗t − ke) if t = 1V et−1(r∗t − ke) if t > 1. (56)
The author’s choice of equity market values as outstanding capitals implies that, in the first period, the in-
ternal rate of return is r∗1=(V
e
1 + d1)/d0−1 (see Ferna´ndez, 2002, p. 281) and r∗t=ke otherwise. This in turn
implies that the CSV model imputes value creation to the first period only (assuming expectations are met):
CSV1=d0(
V e1 +d1−d0
d0
− ke) and CSVt=0 for t > 1.11 This metric is not aligned to Nt, because (if expectations
are met) residual incomes after t > 1 are all zero, regardless of the sign of the Net Present Value. However, the
LC-companion of CSV is aligned with Nt, because it is just the KEP in an equity approach.
Proposition 10. The LC-companion of Ferna´ndez’s CSV is the equity-approach version of the KEP.
Proof. For t =1, one gets
L(CSV1) = CSV1 = d0(V
e
1 + d1 − d0
d0
− ke) = (V e0 − d0) + ke(V e0 − d0) = KEP1.
As for t > 1, to pass from CSVt to L(CSVt) we replace ke V et−1 with ke yt−1(ke) in eq. (56). One finds L(CSV)t =
r∗t V
e
t−1 − ke yt−1(ke) = ke (V et−1 − yt−1(ke)) = KEPt.
Propositions 9 and 10 show that seemingly dissimilar metrics (NEI and CSV) share common conceptual and
formal analogies if they are connected via a LC perspective: Both are goal congruent measures (the NEI directly,
the CSV after transforming it into its LC-companion).
9 Anthony’s argument and the unification of the two paradigms
In his Accounting for the Cost of Interest, Anthony (1975) advocates the use of a charge on equity capital in
accounting statements: The interest on the use of equity capital should be accounted for as an item of cost.
Evidently, to record equity interest as a cost boils down to redefine the notion of profit: In this view, profit
is earnings in excess of the equity interest. Anthony’s profit is therefore just residual income, as he himself
recognizes (Anthony, 1975, p. 3). The idea of recording equity interest as a cost for accounting purposes implies
that, for certain assets, the amounts recorded is higher, and shareholders’ equity is correspondingly higher.
Anthony describes an enlightening example that is worth quoting extensively:
11We also have CSV1=N1=NPV(1 + ke).
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Consider, for example, a corporation that is formed to invest in land. It buys a parcel for $1,000,000, holds
it for five years, sells the land for $2,000,000 at the end of the fifth year, and liquidates . . . In the proposed
system, interest cost would be added to the cost of the land each year, and there would be a corresponding
credit to shareholder’s equity. At the end of the fifth year, there would be an additional entry to shareholders’
equity, representing the net income realized from the sale; that is, the difference between the sales revenue
and the accumulated cost of the land. Thus, the statements would show an increase in shareholders’ equity
in each of the five years. During the first four years, the company would report neither income nor loss;
instead, the costs incurred in holding the land, here assumed to be only equity interest, would be added to
the original cost of the land. In the fifth year, when the sale took place, net income would be reported as
the difference between the selling price and the costs accumulated in inventory up to that time. (Anthony,
1975, p. 30)
As shown below, paraphrasing in a formal way Anthony’s suggestion, an interesting residual income model is
generated. Under Anthony’s proposal, the book value of the land increases periodically by the cost of equity
capital. This means that the depreciation charge for the land is negative (i.e. it is an increase in shareholders’
equity) and is equal to the interest on equity. In other words, the periodic rate of return in the first four years is
set equal to the ROE, and the ROE is set equal to the cost of equity: Formally, the project is ~d=(−1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2)
(in millions), and Anthony is choosing r∗t=ROE=ke and therefore yt(~r
∗) = Bet = yt(ke) for t = 1, 2, 3, 4. The
lost capital coincides with the equity book value and the latter evolves according to yt(ke)=yt−1(ke) · (1 + ke) for
all 1 ≤ t < 5, which is just eq. (8) with i=ke and dt=0 for t < 5. Thus, the equity book values are y0(~r∗) = 1,
y1(~r∗) = (1 + ke), y2(~r∗) = (1 + ke)2, y3(~r∗) = (1 + ke)3, y4(~r∗) = (1 + ke)4. During the first four years,
residual income (Anthony’s profit) is neither positive nor negative, because net income is equal to the increase in
shareholders’ equity,12 which is just equal to the capital charge iyt−1(i)=keyt−1(ke), so that RI=Net Income −
equity capital charge=ke yt−1(ke)−ke yt−1(ke)=0. At time t = 5, the accumulated cost is y4(ke)·(1+ke)=(1+ke)5
and the net income is given by the sum of the negative depreciation (=appreciation) charge key4(ke) and the
surplus generated by the sale of the land: 2− y4(ke) · (1 + ke). Therefore,
Residual Income = Net Income− equity capital charge
=
[
key4(ke) + 2− y4(ke)(1 + ke)
]− key4(ke)
= 2− y4(ke)(1 + ke) = 2− (1 + ke)5
As Anthony acknowledges, last year’s (residual) profit is just the difference between the selling price and the
costs accumulated up to that time. This residual income may be written as y4(ke)(r∗5−ke), with r∗5=
[
(key4(ke)+
2− y4(ke)(1 + ke)
]
/y4(ke)=
[
ke(1 + ke)4 + 2 − (1 + ke)5
]
/(1 + ke)4. It is worth noting that this model provides
zero residual incomes for all years except the last one, when residual income is equal to the project’s Net Final
Value, amounting to 2− (1 + ke)5 = N5=NPV(1 + ke)5.
Applying Anthony’s argument to a generic project, the project’s outstanding capital is set equal to the lost
capital: yt(~r∗)=yt(i) so that eqs. (7) and (8) coincide. Also, taking an equity approach, r∗ is set equal to ROE
and i is set equal to ke for t = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1; a new RI model is thus generated, here named Anthony’s Residual
Income (ARI):
ARIt = r∗t yt−1(ke)− keyt−1(ke) (57)
with r∗t=ke if t < n, and r
∗
n=
keyn−1(ke)+dn−yn−1(ke)(1+ke)
yn−1(ke)
.
12This is because revenues are zero and the depreciation charge is negative (equity appreciates).
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By suggesting that the lost capital be directly recorded in accounting statements, because it represents a real
cost, Anthony implicitly maintains that the appropriate book value of assets should be given by the value assets
would have had if the initial sum d0 had been invested at the cost of equity. This is a conceptual shift: In his
view the book value equals the lost capital, i.e. the capital shareholders renounce to when investing in the project
(firm). However, this lost-opportunity interpretation is not given by Anthony, who, instead, considers the lost
capital not lost at all: It is just the shareholders’ credit. Therefore, he uses a metaphor from loan theory (see
Table 1), and to him the clean surplus relation is derived by interpreting equity as a shareholders’ credit.
This conceptual shift brings about some interesting consequences: [a] The lost capital may be interpreted as
the capital which is “borrowed” from claimholders; [b] Anthony’s residual income is a mirror-image of Ferna´ndez’s
CSV: According to the latter value is created in the first period, according to the former value is created in the
last period. Therefore, the latter is, so to say, finance-derived, whereas the former is accounting-derived; [c]
Anthony’s RI model realizes a unification of the two paradigms. His argument is the only one that is consistent
with both paradigms. As for claim [a], it gives us a fourth interpretation of the lost capital, besides the three
previously found: The lost capital is the capital which is lost by investors (section 2), is the outstanding capital of
a shadow project whose standard RI coincides with the lost-capital RI (Magni, 2000a, 2005, 2006), is the capital
infused into the business (section 5), and is the capital “borrowed” from shareholders, whose interest rate is the
equity cost of capital. These four interpretations, while seemingly discordant, are coherently harmonized under
the formal lens of the LC paradigm.Claim [b] is evident from Table 3, which uses the definition of CSV and
ARI given in the previous and current section respectively: In Anthony’s view, value is recorded only in the last
period, whereas the previous RIs are zero. This is consistent with accounting principles: “In accordance with the
realization concept, income would be reported only in the fifth year, when the land was sold” (Anthony, 1975,
p. 31). In Ferna´ndez’s view, value is created in the first period, when the project is undertaken, whereas the
subsequent RIs are zero. This is consistent with a financial perspective, according to which market immediately
recognizes value creation (see also Robichek and Myers, 1965, pp. 11-12). Referring to dates instead of periods:
Ferna´ndez recognizes value creation at time 0 as a windfall gain (value creation=Net Present Value), Anthony
recognizes value at time n (value creation=Net Final Value). As for claim [c], looking at eqs. (5) and (9), the
two sets of models intersect if and only if yt−1(r∗t − i)=r∗t yt−1 − iyt−1(i) for every t = 1, 2, . . . , n. The above
equality implies yt−1(~r∗) = yt−1(i) for every t = 1, 2, . . . , n, which is just Anthony’s suggestion. Thus, Anthony’s
argument gives rise to a theoretically significant subclass of RI models: They are the only models that belong to
both paradigms. Putting it in equivalent terms, the notion of residual income is univocal if Anthony’s argument
is used, because the project’s outstanding capital is made to coincide with the lost capital.13,14
10 Concluding remarks
This paper presents an investigation into an alternative non-standard notion of residual income (RI), originally
introduced in Magni (2000a,b,c, 2001a,b) with the name Systemic Value Added. The paradigm is here renamed
“lost-capital” (LC) paradigm, owing to the central role played by the capital that investors lose by undertaking
13Strictly speaking, Anthony selects r∗=ROE=i=ke, but obviously his argument also implies the possible choice of
r∗=ROA=i=wacc, which means that an entity perspective is adopted.
14Anthony’s example may be interpreted as a particular case of either EBO or L(EBO), where ROE is set equal to ke
in all periods but the last one.
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the project. The LC paradigm is a theoretical domain which enables one to embrace varied notions, results, and
models which have been developed in different fields with disparate scopes and aims. In particular, this paper
has shown that the LC paradigm is easily interpretable in an arbitrage theory setting, and that Keynes’s notion
of user cost is a basic ingredient of it. The lost-capital residual income enables one to lump together two types of
depreciation: Depreciation through time and depreciation through use (user cost). Gathering the two one obtains
the Keynesian Excess Profit, which is a (market-based) subclass of LC residual incomes, which have the nice
property of being aligned in sign with the project’s NPV (goal congruence). Among such measures, we analyze
Drukarczyk and Schueler’s (2000) Net Economic Income and the LC-companion of Ferna´ndez’s Created Share-
holder Value. While different from the standard paradigm, strict relations of the two paradigms are underlined
and it is shown that the LC approach, contrary to the standard one, enjoys a nice aggregation property which
enables one to aggregate residual incomes for forecasting purposes without worrying about forecasts of each and
every residual income. The lost capital itself is also given a fourfold interpretation: capital foregone, capital
infused into the business, capital borrowed from shareholders, and capital of a shadow project (for the latter, see
Magni, 2005). Relations are thoroughly investigated among NPV, book values and market values, shedding lights
on O’Hanlon and Peasnell’s (2002) results and providing counterparts in the lost-capital approach. Furthermore,
the LC residual income is interpreted as the future value of cumulated Ohlson’s (2005) Abnormal Earnings
Growth, a notion which is equivalent to O’Byrne’s (1997) EVA improvement, based on Miller and Modigliani’s
investment opportunities approach to valuation. Furthermore, Young and O’Byrne’s (2001) notion of Adjusted
EVA coincides with the LC residual income if earnings equal dividends. Finally, Anthony’s (1975) notion of profit
is shown to give rise to a class of metrics which just represents the intersection of the sets of standard residual
incomes and LC residual incomes.
Future researches may be devoted to deepen the theoretical network originated by the LC paradigm, which
seems to be susceptible of embracing several different notions and models and providing a fruitful integration
among concepts in various fields such as economics, accounting, finance. An enrichment of this conceptual
environment will possibly address in a more thorough way the issue of practical usefulness of this paradigm for
value creation, capital budgeting decisions, managerial incentives and control. The results found seem to be
auspicious.
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Table 0. Notational Conventions
Symbol means is equal to
AE Adjusted EVA
AEG Abnormal Earnings Growth
AIC Adjusted Invested Capital
ARIt Anthony’s Residual Income
Bt book value
Bet book value of equity
Blt book value of total liabilities
cfroe Cash Flow Return On Equity
cfroi Cash Flow Return On Investment
Ct value of the reinvestment proceeds at time t− 1
Ct amount of wealth at time t if project is not undertaken
CSV Created Shareholder Value
~d project, firm, business
dt cash flow from ~d available for distribution equity cash flow/free cash flow
~dt uniperiodic project
~d0,t first part of project ~d
~dt,n second part of project ~d
∆MVAt Market Value Added’s variation MVAt−MVAt−1
∆Nt Net Present Value’s variation Nt −Nt−1
∆yt(·) capital’s variation yt(·)− yt−1(·)
EBO Edwards-Bell-Ohlson
ECF Equity Cash Flow
EVA Economic Value Added
EV Ct Excess Value Created Nt
FCF Free Cash Flow
Ft future value of cumulated AEGs
G value of assets if they are used Vt
G′ value of assets if they had not been used yt(i)
G′ −G user cost yt(i)− Vt
gMVA generalized Market Value Added Vt − yt(~r∗)
i (opportunity) cost of capital
ICt current invested capital yt(i)
kD cost of debt (required return on debt)
ke cost of equity (required return on equity)
kU cost of assets (required return on assets)
KEPt Keynesian Excess Profit
LC lost capital
(The Table is continued on the next page)
continued - Table 0. Notational Conventions
Symbol means is equal to
L(CSV) LC companion of CSV
L(EBO) LC companion of EBO
L(EVA) LC companion of EVA
L(xat ) LC companion of xat
L−1(NEI) standard companion of NEI
MVt market value Vt
MVA Market Value Added V et −Bet
Nt time-t Net Present Value NPV(1 + i)t
Nn Net Final Value NPV(1 + i)n
NCFk Net Cash Flow Free Cash Flow
NEIt Net Economic Income
NPV Net Present Value
∑n
k=1
dk
(1+i)k
− d0
rt period rate of return
r∗t period internal rate of return
~r ∗ internal discount function for project ~d
RI residual income
ROA Return On Assets
ROE Return On Equity
u compounding factor 1 + i
U0t unrecovered capital yt(i)
v discount factor (1 + i)−1
Vt market value
∑n
k=t+1
dk
(1+i)k−t
V et market value of equity
∑n
k=t+1
ECFk
(1+ke)k−t
V lt market value of total liabilities/assets
∑n
k=t+1
FCFk
(1+wacc)k
V U market value of the unlevered firm
∑n
k=t+1
FCFk
(1+kU )k−t
wacc weighted average cost of capital
xat standard RI
xa
k,(~dt,n)
standard RI of project ~d’s second part
ξat lost-capital RI
ξa
k,(~dt,n)
lost-capital RI of project ~d’s second part
yt−1 capital invested
yt−1(~r∗) outstanding capital of project ~d
yt−1(~r) outstanding capital growing at rate rt
yt−1(i) lost capital of project ~d
y◦t (i) initial lost capital of project ~dt,n yt(~r
∗)
zt Abnormal Earnings Growth Residual earningst+1 − Residual Earningst
Table 1. The firm and the loan
FIRM LOAN
cash flow −→ instalment dt
capital employed −→ residual debt (outstanding balance) yt−1
capital’s depreciaton −→ principal repayment yt−1 − yt
periodic rate of return −→ contractual rate rt
income −→ interest rtyt−1
Table 2. Constructing residual incomes in the two paradigms
IDF yt(~r∗) i yt(i) dt
Entity approach
EVA ROA Blt wacc yt(wacc) FCF
RIcfroi cfroi yt(cfroi) wacc yt(wacc) FCF
NEI
r∗1 =
V l1+d1−d0
d0
r∗t = wacc
V lt wacc yt(wacc) FCF
Equity approach
EBO ROE Bet ke yt(ke) ECF
RIcfroe cfroe yt(cfroe) ke yt(ke) ECF
CSV
r∗1 =
V e1 +d1−d0
d0
r∗t = ke
V et ke yt(ke) ECF
Table 3. Anthony’s and Ferna´ndez’s symmetric residual incomes
period
1 2 3 . . . n−1 n
Anthony’s Residual Income 0 0 0 . . . 0 NPV(1 + ke)n
Created Shareholder Value NPV(1 + ke) 0 0 . . . 0 0
Appendix. A firm is incorporated to undertake a 5-year project. Tables 4 and 5 collect the input data (in
boldface), the firm’s accounting statements, the resulting expected cash flows and rates of return, while Table 6
computes market values. To this end, it is assumed that the required return to total assets is kU=11.9%, and
that the nominal debt is equal to the market value of debt, i.e. the interest rate is equal to the required return on
debt (here assumed to equal 8%). The market value of equity turns out to be 30 457 and the Net Present Value
is 456.9. Table 7 focusses on the 3+3 groups of metrics, and the residual incomes are calculated for each period.
Logically, each of them represents a decomposition of 456.9, and is obtained by a “Discount&Sum” procedure
for the standard metrics and by a “Sum&Discount” method for the lost-capital metrics. Inspecting Table 7, the
reader may appreciate the considerable differences across paradigms and across metrics. It is worth noting that
the KEP metrics are perfectly aligned in sign with the NPV (goal congruence) and they are the only metrics
that enjoy this property. It is also worth noting that discrepancies among standard metrics and LC metrics
concern not only magnitude, but sign as well: for example in the third and fourth periods RIcfroi signals value
destruction in the standard paradigm and value creation in the LC paradigm; in the second period RIcfroe signals
value creation in the standard paradigm and value destruction in the LC companion. As for Anthony’s Residual
Income, from Table 3 one finds ARIt=0 for t < 5 and ARI5=861 (value creation is signalled only in the final
period).
Table 4. Input data, Balance Sheet, Income Statement
Time 0 1 2 3 4 5
BALANCE SHEET
Net fixed assets 45 000 36 000 27 000 18 000 9 000 0
Working capital 15 000 15 000 15 000 15 000 15 000 0
TOTAL ASSETS 60 000 51 000 42 000 33 000 24 000 0
Debt 30 000 20 000 10 000 5 000 2 000 0
Equity (book value) 30 000 31 000 32 000 28 000 22 000 0
TOTAL LIABILITIES 60 000 51 000 42 000 33 000 24 000 0
INCOME STATEMENT
Sales 31 500 32 100 31 500 27 500 28 000
−Cost of sales and other expenses 14 000 14 000 14 000 14 000 14 000
−Depreciation 9 000 9 000 9 000 9 000 9 000
Earnings before interest and taxes 8 500 9 100 8 500 4 500 5 000
Interest rate 8% 8% 8% 8% 8%
−Interest 2 400 1 600 800 400 160
Profit before taxes 6 100 7 500 7 700 4 100 4 840
Tax rate 33% 33% 33% 33% 33%
−Taxes 2 013 2 475 2 541 1 353 1 597
Profit after taxes 4 087 5 025 5 159 2 747 3 243
Table 5. Cash flow and rates
Time 0 1 2 3 4 5
ECF† −30 000 3 087 4 025 9 159 8 747 25 243
FCF‡ −60 000 14 695 15 097 14 695 12 015 27 350
Cash flow to debt (instalment) −30 000 12 400 11 600 5 800 3 400 2 160
roi 9.49% 11.95% 13.56% 9.14% 13.96%
roe 13.62% 16.21% 16.12% 9.81% 14.74%
cfroi 11.23% 11.23% 11.23% 11.23% 11.23%
cfroe 14.28% 14.28% 14.28% 14.28% 14.28%
†ECF=Profit after taxes+Depreciation + ∆ Debt − ∆ Working Capital; ‡FCF=ECF+Cash Flow to Debt − Tax rate·
Interest
Table 6. Valuation
Time 0 1 2 3 4 5
kU 11.9% 11.9% 11.9% 11.9% 11.9%
kD 8% 8% 8% 8% 8%
V U 58 928 51 246 42 247 32 580 24 441 0
Value of Tax Shield† 1529 859 400 167 49 0
V l 60 457 52 105 42 647 32 747 24 490 0
V e=V l−Debt 30 457 32 105 32 647 27 747 22 490 0
ke 15.55% 14.23% 13.05% 12.58% 12.24%
V e=
∑n
j=t+1
ECFj∏j
τ=t+1(1+keτ )
30 457 32 105 32 647 27 747 22 490 0
wacc 10.49% 10.82% 11.24% 11.48% 11.68%
V e=
∑n
j=t+1
FCFj∏j
τ=t+1(1+waccτ )
−Debt 30 457 32 105 32 647 27 747 22 490 0
Nt 457 528 603 682 767 861
†Three consistent methods are here used to find the equity value of the firm: the Adjusted Present Value, the ECF method,
the FCF method. The value of tax shield is computed by discounting the tax shields at the required return on debt (8%).
While not relevant to the subject of this paper, it is worth noting that there is a lively debate in the literature on the
correct discount rate for computing the tax shield (see Myers, 1974; Harris and Pringle, 1985; Tham and Ve´lez-Pareja,
2001; Arzac and Glosten, 2005; Ferna´ndez, 2005; Cooper and Nyborg, 2006).
Table 7. Performance metrics and its companions†
Period 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
EVA −600 578 972 −772 548 L(EVA) −600 513 963 −672 571
EBO −577 615 984 −775 550 L(EBO) −577 533 978 −658 584
RIcfroi 445 214 −5 −80 −109 L(RIcfroi) 445 262 75 10 −17
RIcfroe −380 17 390 459 451 L(RIcfroe) −380 −37 335 448 495
L−1(NEI) 505 0 0 0 0 NEI‡ 505 55 63 71 81
CSV 528 0 0 0 0 L(CSV)‡ 528 75 79 86 94
†Numbers are rounded off; ‡Keynesian Excess Profit
